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Hit and Run: The Paralyzing Effect of
Pennsylvania's Habitual Offender Statute
I. Introduction
Jim Brown, the father of three small children, is a steelworker
in a small plant twenty-five miles from his home. He drives back and
forth to work on a daily basis. On September 27, he received notice
from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation that he had
violated several provisions of Pennsylvania's Vehicle Code. Mr.
Brown was surprised by this notice and attributed it to a bureau-
cratic mix-up. He called his local police department, but was told
that his only remedy was to either pay the fines or go through the
timely and costly process of challenging the charges. Mr. Brown
chose not to challenge the notice. Instead, he paid the three fines in
order to end the controversy quietly and quickly. Two weeks later, he
was notified that because he had cooperated and paid the fines, his
driver's license was being revoked. Under Pennsylvania state law,
Jim Brown had unknowingly become what the law defines a habitual
offender.
What the unsuspecting Jim Brown encountered was the insidi-
ous effect of the current habitual offender statute of the Pennsylva-
nia Vehicle Code.' Under this statute, the Department of Transpor-
1. The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code is contained in 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101-9910
(1984). The habitual offender statute is found in 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542 (1984). It
provides:
§ 1542. Revocation of habitual offender's license.
(a) General rule.-The department shall revoke the operating privilege of
any person found to be a habitual offender pursuant to the provisions of this
section. A "habitual offender" shall be any person whose driving record, as
maintained in the department, shows that such person has accumulated the req-
uisite number of convictions for the separate and distinct offenses described and
enumerated in subsection (b) committed after the effective date of this title and
within any period of five years thereafter.
(b) Offenses enumerated.-Three convictions arising from separate acts of
any one or more of the following offenses committed either singularly or in com-
bination by any person shall result in such person being designated as a habitual
offender:
(1) Any offense set forth in section 1532 (relating to revocation or
suspension of operating privilege).
(2) Operation following suspension of registration as defined in sec-
tion 1371 (relating to operation following suspension of registration).
(3) Making use of or operating any vehicle without the knowledge or
consent of the owner or custodian thereof.
(4) Utilizing a vehicle in the unlawful transportation or unlawful
sale of alcohol or any controlled substance.
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tation must revoke the operating privilege2 of any Pennsylvania
motorist3 who meets its requirements.4 While the statute at first ap-
pears simple and straightforward, the above hypothetical situation is
illustrative of just one of the statute's many subtleties and complexi-
ties that have resulted in a multitude of litigation and confusion over
its precise meanings and ramifications.
This Comment will address those subtleties and complexities.
First, it will examine the language of Section 1542 and the relevant
case law construing it in order to provide a basic understanding of
the scope and nature of the statute.5 Next, it will discuss the chal-
lenges that have been made to the procedural aspects of Section
1542 and the attacks that-have been made on its constitutionality.'
It will then compare the habitual traffic offender statutes of other
states in order to determine whether better or fairer alternatives ex-
ist to regulate habitual traffic offenders and resolve the dilemma
presently faced in Pennsylvania.7 Finally, this Comment will con-
clude with recommendations on how Pennsylvania can improve Sec-
tion 1542 in order to afford its habitual traffic offenders fairer proce-
dural treatment.8
(5) Any felony in the commission of which a court determines that a
vehicle was essentially involved.
(c) Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposition as an offense.-Acceptance of
Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposition for any offense enumerated in subsection
(b) shall be considered an offense for the purposes of this section.
(d) Period of revocation.-The operating privilege of any person found to be
a habitual offender under the provisions of this section shall be revoked by the
department for a period of five years.
(e) Additional offenses.-Any additional offense committed within a period
of five years shall result in a revocation for an additional period of two years.
2. The term "operating privilege," as defined by the Vehicle Code, is "[t]he privilege to
apply for and obtain a license to use as well as the privilege to use a vehicle on a highway as
authorized in this title, but not a contract, property right or civil right." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §
102 (1984). For purposes of this Comment, the terms "operating privilege" and "driver's li-
cense" will be synonymous.
3. The Department of Transportation may also revoke the operating privilege of an out-
of-state motorist if that motorist is a citizen of a state which has a reciprocity agreement with
the Commonwealth. See 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 6141-6153 (1984).
4. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(d).
5. See infra notes 9-82 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 83-124 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 151-77 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 184-211 and accompanying text.
HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE
II. Pennsylvania's "Habitual Offender" Statute: Its Meaning and
Operation
A. Habitual Offender Defined
Section 15421 requires the Department of Transportation to re-
voke10 the operating privilege of any motorist found to be a habitual
offender under its provisions. The statute defines a "habitual of-
fender" as any motorist who has accumulated the requisite number
of convictions for the separate and distinct offenses 'specifically enu-
merated within the statute.1 It defines the requisite number of con-
victions as three convictions 2 committed within either the effective
date of the statute's title"3 or within five years thereafter. " When
these requirements are met, the Department of Transportation is
compelled to revoke the operating privilege of the habitual offender
for a mandatory period of five years.'
1. Offenses that Result in Designation of Motorist as a Habit-
ual Offender.-Section 1542 specifically lists the offenses which are
to be counted in determining whether a motorist qualifies as a habit-
9. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542 (1984). See supra note I for full text.
10. Initially, a distinction must be made between a "revocation" and a "suspension" as
they are defined by the Vehicle Code. "Revoke" is defined as "terminat[ing] by formal action
of the department any license, registration or privilege issued or granted by the department.
Following a period of revocation, the license, registration or privilege may not be restored
except upon submission and acceptance of a new application." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102
(1984).
"Suspend" is defined as "withdraw[ing] temporarily by formal action of the department
any license, registration or privilege issued or granted by the department. Following a period of
suspension, the department shall restore the license, registration or privilege." Id.
A revocation, which Section 1542 mandates, is clearly the harsher of the two penalties.
This is further illustrated by the requirements imposed by the Vehicle Code for restoration of
a revoked operating privilege:
Any person whose operating privilege has been revoked pursuant to section
1542 (relating to revocation of habitual offender's license) or 1543 (relating to
driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked) is not entitled to auto-
matic restoration of the operation privilege. Such person may apply for a
learner's permit, if permitted under the provisions of this chapter, upon expira-
tion of the revocation.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1541(c) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
II. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(a).
12. 75 PA. CONST. STAT. § 1542(b).
13. See Act of June 17, 1976, Pub. L. 162, No. 81 § 8(b), 1976 Pa. Laws 162, 386
(providing that Section 1542 is to take effect immediately). But see Act of June 17, 1976, Pub.
L. 162, No. 81 § 8(a), 1976 Pa. Laws 162,386 (providing that the Vehicle Code was to gener-
ally become effective July I, 1977). See also Lutz v. Commonwealth, No. 744 C.D. 1982 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. filed April 25, 1984) (in which Section 1542 was held to take effect immedi-
ately). Accord Commonwealth v. Eichhorn, 73 Pa. Commw. 425, 458 A.2d 322 (1983).
14. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(a).
15. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(d).
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ual offender."6 Three convictions arising from separate acts of any
one or more of the enumerated offenses, committed either singularly
or in combination within a five year period, will result in the desig-
nation of a motorist as a habitual offender.'7 These offenses include
(1) any offense set forth in Section 1532; 18 (2) the operation of a
vehicle following the suspension of its registration;' 9 (3) the use or
operation of any vehicle without the knowledge or consent of the
owner or custodian;2 0 (4) the use of a vehicle for the unlawful trans-
portation or sale of either alcohol or controlled substances;2' (5) the
commission of any felony in which a court determines that a vehicle
was essentially involved; 2  and (6) the acceptance of Accelerative
Rehabilitative Disposition for any of the above enumerated
offenses.28
In addition to these specifically enumerated offenses, any offense
committed under the prior Vehicle Code,24 which essentially includes
the offenses presently included in Section 1542, may also be consid-
ered in the determination of a motorist's habitual offender status. 5
This is true even if the language of the old statute and that of the
new differ substantially.26 Thus, a motorist convicted of an offense
under the prior Vehicle Code and then convicted of two or more of-
fenses under the present Vehicle Code can be classified as a habitual
offender if all three of the offenses occurred within a five year period.
2. Problems in Interpretations of Offenses.-While the of-
fenses specifically identified in Section 1542 seem understandable, it
has been specifically about these offenses that most of the confusion
and litigation over the statute has occurred. Motorists are confused
by what constitutes a conviction under Section 1542,2" by how many
16. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(b).
17. Id.
18. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1532 (1984) (relating to revocation or suspension of operating
privilege).
19. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1371 (1984) (operation following suspension of registration).
20. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(b)(3).
21. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(b)(4).
22. Supra note 1, at § 1542(b)(5). See, e.g., Mishler v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa.
Commw. 618, 519 A.2d 565 (1986) (police officers indicated that motorist's crimes substan-
tially involved a motorcycle theft operation).
23. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(c).
24. Act of April 29, 1959, Pub. L. 58, 1959 Pa. Laws 58, repealed by Act of June 17,
1976, Pub. L. 162 § 7(a), 1976 Pa. Laws 162, 386.
25. See Commonwealth v. Conner, 96 Pa. Commw. 26, 28-29, 506 A.2d 514, 516
(1986); Commonwealth v. Eichhorn, 73 Pa. Commw. 425, 429, 458 A.2d 322, 324 (1983).
26. Conner, 96 Pa. Commw. at 28-29, 506 A.2d at 516; Eichhorn, 73 Pa. Commw. at
429, 458 A.2d at 324.
27. See infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
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offenses can be committed within a single incident under Section
1542,28 by how many offenses are required under Section 1542's pro-
visions, 9 and by the consequences of accepting Accelerative Reha-
bilitative Disposition. 0
(a) Convictions.-Under the Vehicle Code, a "conviction" is not
merely a finding of guilt by a court."1 It may also be an unvacated
forfeiture of bail or collateral that was deposited to secure a motor-
ist's appearance in court,32 or any entry of a guilty plea or a plea of
nolo contendere.33 More importantly, it may also be a payment of a
fine" ' and, under Section 1542, an acceptance of Accelerative Reha-
bilitative Disposition. 5 Any one of these convictions will be consid-
ered in the determination of a motorist's habitual offender status. In
all instances, however, neither the courts nor the Department of
Transportation has the duty to warn a motorist that his operating
privilege will be revoked if he chooses to pursue any of the above
courses of action.36 Thus, a motorist who is unaware of such subtle-
ties can easily and unknowingly pursue a cause of action which will
ultimately result in the revocation of his operating privilege.
In addition to the subtleties involved in determining what will
ultimately constitute a conviction under Section 1542, there is one
other important point camouflaged within the concept of "convic-
tion." Although a motorist does have to be convicted of three of-
fenses in order to obtain the unenviable status of a habitual offender,
it is not the dates of these convictions that are controlling in making
28. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
31. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6501(a) (1984).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6501(b) (1984). See also Commonwealth v. Chrzanowski, 95
Pa. Commw. 568, 505 A.2d 1129 (1986); Commonwealth v. Valentine, 71 Pa. Commw. 8, 453
A.2d 742 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gray, 59 Pa. Commw. 590, 430 A.2d 407 (1981).
35. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(c). See also Commonwealth v. Becker, 366 Pa.
Super. 54, 530 A.2d 888 (1987); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, No. 2933 C.D. 1984 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Feb. 12, 1987); Lutz v. Commonwealth, No. 744 C.D. 1982 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
April 25, 1984); Commonwealth v. Rice, 77 Pa. Commw. 34, 465 A.2d 68 (1983); In re Elias,
70 Pa. Commw. 404, 453 A.2d 372 (1982); Commonwealth v. McDevitt, 57 Pa. Commw. 589,
427 A.2d 280 (1980), affid per curiam, 500 Pa. 530, 453 A.2d 939 (1983).
36. See Werner v. Commonwealth, No. 2913 C.D. 1985 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 13,
1987); Hillwig v. Commonwealth, No. 141 C.D. 1986 (Pa. Commw. Ct. April 27, 1987);
Brophy v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 310, 503 A.2d 1010 (1986); Brewster v. Common-
wealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986); Zanotto v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa.
Commw. 69, 475 A.2d 1375 (1984); Yeckley v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. Commw. 576, 474
A.2d 71 (1984). Cf. Commonwealth v. Englert, 457 Pa. Super. 121, 457 A.2d 121 (1983)
(suspension of operation privilege is a collateral consequence, civil in nature, of a conviction,
and a trial court's failure to inform a motorist of a potential collateral consequence does not
invalidate a guilty plea).
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this determination. Rather, it is the dates of the violations that
control ."
For example, in Sanders v. Commonwealth,38 a motorist com-
mitted three violations of the Vehicle Code - on January 11, 1978,
on June 14, 1981, and on September 25, 1982, respectively.39 All
three violations, therefore, occurred within the requisite five year pe-
riod. Sanders, however, was not convicted of his last violation until
March 21, 1983,0 well over five years from the date of the his initial
violation. Sanders thus argued that since his last conviction fell
outside of the five year period, he should not be classified as a habit-
ual offender. 1 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court disagreed
and held that the dates of the violations, rather than the dates of the
convictions, control in a determination of a motorist's habitual of-
fender status.'2 The actual convictions are used only for the records
of the Department of Transportation to confirm the commission of
the offenses by the motorist.'
3
(b) Number of offenses committed within a single inci-
dent.-Section 1542 states that a habitual offender is a motorist
whose driving record shows that he has accumulated the requisite
number of convictions for the separate and distinct offenses specifi-
cally enumerated in the statute." Moreover, it states that the convic-
tions of these offenses must arise from separate acts of any one or
more of the identified offenses committed either singularly or in
combination.' As a result, the courts have determined that within a
single incident, irrespective of a time, a motorist can commit the
three offenses needed to be classified as a habitual offender.'
6
37. See Wainer v. Commonwealth, No. 1461 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 27,
1987).
38. 89 Pa. Commw. 609, 493 A.2d 794 (1985).
39. Id. at 610, 493 A.2d at 795.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 611, 493 A.2d at 795.
42. Id. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that "'the clear reading of the sec-
tion [1542] shows that the commission of the offenses, and not the convictions which result,
must occur within the five year period." Id. The recent case of Hewitt v. Commonwealth, -
Pa. Commw. __ A.2d - (1988) (to be reported at 541 A.2d 1183) reaffirms the
Sanders holding. In dismissing the appeal, Commonwealth Court rejected Hewitt's argument
that Sanders was not controlling with respect to the dates of his violations being determinative
of his habitual offender status. The court declared the argument to be frivolous and therefore
imposed attorney's fees against Hewitt pursuant to PA. R. App. P. 2744.
43. Wainer v. Commonwealth, No. 1461 C.D. 1984, slip op. at 4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan.
27, 1987).
44. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(a).
45. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(b).
46. See Wainer v. Commonwealth, No. 1461 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 27,
1987); Poole v. Commonwealth, No. 419 C.D. 1982 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. I, 1986); Murdy
HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE
For example, in Johnson v. Commonwealth,4 7 a motorist who
drove his vehicle through three different jurisdictions without his
headlights on in order to avoid detection by the authorities was held
to have committed the three separate offenses necessary to be classi-
fied as a habitual offender,4 8 despite the fact that he committed
those three offenses within three minutes and the fact that two of the
three offenses resulted from violations of the same section of the Ve-
hicle Code.
4 1
(c) Number of offenses required under Section
1532(b)(2).-Section 1542 specifically requires that a motorist be
designated a habitual offender if that motorist violates three of its
specifically enumerated offenses5" within a five year period 1 and the
motorist is convicted of those violations."2 There is, however, one ex-
ception to this general requirement. 3
Section 1542(b)(1) specifically includes in its enumerated of-
fenses "[alny offense set forth in section 1532 (relating to revocation
or suspension of operating privilege)." 4 Section 1532,"' in turn, lists
those offenses which, upon conviction, will result in either the sus-
pension of that motorist's operating privilege for six months56 or the
revocation of that motorist's operating privilege for a period of one
year.5
7
It is within the offenses listed in Section 1532 that the exception
v. Commonwealth, No. 3218 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 24, 1986); Brewster v. Com-
monwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986); Commonwealth v. Frye, 88 Pa.
Commw. 380, 489 A.2d 984 (1985), appeal granted, 508 Pa. 356, 497 A.2d 1330 (1985);
Mantangos v. Commonwealth, No. 276 C.D. 1982 (Pa. Commw. June 26, 1985); Johns v.
Commonwealth, No. 128 C.D. 1983 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 7, 1985); Melcher v. Common-
wealth, 58 Pa. Commw. 634, 428 A.2d 773 (1984); Notl v. Commonwealth, 64 Pa. Commw.
144, 439 A.2d 874 (1982); Commonwealth v. Auman, 59 Pa. Commw. 468, 430 A.2d 373
(1981); Commonwealth v. Byers, 59 Pa. Commw. 404, 429 A.2d 1274 (1981); Commonwealth
v. McDevitt, 57 Pa. Commw. 589, 427 A.2d 280 (1980), aff'd, 500 Pa. 530, 458 A.2d 939
(1983); Weaver v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. Commw. 625, 416 A.2d 628 (1980).
47. 68 Pa. Commw. 384, 449 A.2d 121 (1982).
48. Id. at 387, 449 A.2d at 123. See also Reese v. Commonwealth, 71 Pa. Commw. 244,
455 A.2d 232 (1983) (two violations occurred arising from a single incident but within two
different jurisdictions count as two separate offenses in determining motorist's habitual of-
fender status).
49. 68 Pa. Commw. at 387, 449 A.2d at 123.
50. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(b).
51. Id. § 1542(a).
52. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
54. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(b)(1).
55. Id. § 1532.
56. Id. § 1532(b).
57. Id. § 1532(a).
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to the general requirement of three convictions is found.58 Section
1532(b)(2) requires the suspension of a motorist's operating privilege
for a period of six months if that motorist is convicted of a subse-
quent offense of either driving without a license59 or driving while
that motorist's operating privilege is either suspended or revoked.60
In these two instances, the requirement of a "subsequent offense"
has the result of requiring one additional offense over and above the
usual requirement of three."1 This is the only exception to the gen-
eral requirement of three convictions under Section 1542.
(d) Acceptance of Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposi-
tion.-Section 1542 expressly states that an acceptance of Accelera-
tive Rehabilitative Disposition 2 (A.R.D.) will be considered an of-
fense under its habitual offender provisions.63 More importantly,
even though formal convictions of the driving violations underlying a
motorist's admission into the program will never be obtained because
A.R.D. is technically an alternative to prosecution,64 the Pennsylva-
nia Commonwealth Court has consistently adhered to the declara-
tion of Section 1542 that acceptance of A.R.D. is an offense under
the provisions of the statute.65 The court has further held that such
58. See id. § 1532(b)(2), which states:
(2) The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any driver for
six months upon receiving a certified record of the driver's conviction of a subse-
quent offense under the following provisions:
Section 1501(a) (relating to drivers required to be licensed).
Section 1543 (relating to driving while operating privilege is suspended or
revoked).
59. Id. § 1501(a).
60. Id. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1543 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
61. See Werner v. Commonwealth, No. 2913 C.D. 1985 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 13,
1987) (in which the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court stated that although Werner believed
that Section I 532(b)(2) confused the interpretation of Section 1542, the Court's reading of the
two statutes clearly required only subsequent violations of the offenses committed under Sec-
tion 1532(b)(2) to be counted in determining a motorist's status as a habitual offender); Com-
monwealth v. Gray, 59 Pa. Commw. 590, 430 A.2d 407 (1981) (in which the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court held that only a fourth offense of Section 1543 will result in a determi-
nation of a motorist as a habitual offender).
62. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85.
63. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(c).
64. See Commonwealth v. McDevitt, 57 Pa. Commw. 589, 427 A.2d 280 (1980), aftfd,
500 Pa. 530, 458 A.2d 939 (1983). See also Commonwealth v. Burdge, 345 Pa. Super. 187,
497 A.2d 1367 (1985).
65. Commonwealth v. Scheinert, 519 A.2d 422, 359 Pa. Super. 423 (1986). McDevitt,
57 Pa. Commw. 589, 427 A.2d 280. See also Hillwig v. Commonwealth, No. 141 C.D. 1986
(Pa. Commw. Ct. April 27, 1987); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, No. 2933 C.D. 1984 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Jan. 12, 1987); Brophy v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 310, 503 A.2d 1010
(1986); Neumann v. Commonwealth, No. 2637 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 28, 1986);
Brewster v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986);'Lutz v. Common-
wealth, No. 744 C.D. 1982 (Pa. Commw. Ct. April 25, 1984); Commonwealth v. Rice, 77 Pa.
Commw. 34, 465 A.2d 68 (1983); In re Elias, 70 Pa. Commw. 404, 453 A.2d 372 (1982).
HABITUAL OFFENDER STATUTE
an acceptance is a conviction to be used in calculating a motorist's
habitual offender status. 66 Thus, in Commonwealth v. McDevitt,6 7
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in rejecting McDevitt's ar-
gument that his acceptance into the A.R.D. program should not con-
stitute a conviction under Section 1542, stated:
[McDevitt] argues that the mandate of Section 1542(c), to
consider acceptance of A.R.D. as an offense, is meaningless in
view of the declared policy of Sections 1542(a) and 1542(b) that
only convictions of offenses will result in a driver's being desig-
nated an habitual offender. [McDevitt's] interpretation of the
[Vehicle] Code would, in effect, nullify Section 1542(c) and ex-
onerate [McDevitt] with respect to his multiple driving viola-
tions of April 8 and May 21. This argument would entirely insu-
late from censure a driver such as [McDevitt], who was
admitted to the A.R.D. program despite his having committed a
new driving violation only a few weeks after his initial offenses.
[McDevitt] chose a program where formal convictions could not
be obtained. Before this Court [McDevitt] now wrongfully ar-
gues that the offenses underlying his admission into the A.R.D.
program cannot be used to determine whether he was an habit-
ual offender solely because he was not formally convicted of the
underlying offenses. Such a result would be contrary to the legis-
lative intent of Section 1542 to protect the public from repeated
incidences of careless driving by assessing additional penalties
against persons categorized as habitual offenders. Moreover,
rules of statutory construction require (1) that whenever possi-
ble, effect must be given to all provisions of a legislative act, and
(2) that statutory language may not be supposed
supererogatory. 68
Since the court's interpretation was upheld by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, 9 there is no doubt that acceptance of the program,
which technically is not a conviction, becomes a conviction for habit-
ual offender purposes.
B. Revocation
Once it has been determined that a motorist is a habitual of-
fender under the provisions of Section 1542,70 the Department of
66. See supra note 65.
67. 57 Pa. Commw. 589, 427 A.2d 280 (1980), afl'd, 500 Pa. 530, 458 A.2d 939 (1983).
68. Id. at 592-93, 427 A.2d at 282 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
69. 500 Pa. 530, 458 A.2d 939.
70. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542 (1984).
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Transportation must revoke that motorist's operating privilege. 1
While the statute specifies what offenses are to be counted in deter-
mining if a motorist is a habitual offender,72 it fails to provide any
requirements as to when the Department of Transportation must
make this revocation. It has therefore been left primarily to the
courts to make this determination. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court has stated:
The provisions of Section 1542(a) must be construed to im-
pliedly require the Department to give notice of revocation as a
habitual offender within a "reasonable" time after it receives the
triggering third conviction notice. Naturally, what will consti-
tute a "reasonable" time in a given case cannot be established in
a vacuum and we believe, therefore, that this meaning will de-
pend upon the circumstances of each case.74
Thus, is has been held that a revocation may not be reversed merely
because a period of time has elapsed between the time the Depart-
ment of Transportation was notified of the third conviction and the
time it took the Department of Transportation to act.7 5 Nor will the
Department of Transportation be held accountable for any delays
caused by district justices.7 6 Rather, for a revocation to be found
improper, the delay in making the revocation must be chargeable to
the Department of Transportation and unreasonable.7 7 More impor-
tantly, the motorist has the burden to prove unreasonableness by
bringing forth evidence of actual prejudice to himself due to his reli-
ance on the Department of Transportation's failure to act within a
71. Id. § 1542(b).
72. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
73. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(a).
74. Lemley v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. Commw. 469, 473, 509 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1986),
appeal denied, 415 Pa. 620, 521 A.2d 934 (1987).
75. See Poole v. Commonwealth, No. 419 C.D. 1982, slip op. at 2 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Aug. 1, 1986). See also Gilson v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. Commw. 616, 462 A.2d 357 (1983).
76. See Commonwealth v. Parr, 56 Pa. Commw. 203, 424 A.2d 604 (1981), in which
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court stated:
The Department correctly argues that the [tirial [clourt erred because the
delay in issuing the notice was caused by the district justice's failure to notify
the Department of the conviction for 17 months. Even if the Department some-
how knew of Parr's conviction, it could not act until it received a certified record
of his conviction. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(b). We have held that no delay can be
chargeable to the Department before it is in receipt of the certification of
conviction.
Id. at 206, 424 A.2d at 605. See also Commonwealth v. Lyons, 70 Pa. Commw. 604, 453 A.2d
730 (1982); Chappel v. Commonwealth, 59 Pa. Commw. 504, 430 A.2d 377 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Coller, 59 Pa. Commw. 488, 430 A.2d 358 (1981); Saron v. Commonwealth, 55 Pa.
Commw. 477, 423 A.2d 1099 (1980).





Once a motorist has been determined to be a habitual offender
and his operating privilege has been revoked, that motorist is not
immune from the imposition of further sanctions.79 Section 1542(e)
specifically states that any additional offense committed within a five
year period will result in a revocation of the motorist's operating
privilege for an additional two years.80 The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court has interpreted this provision to mean that any offense
committed over and above the requisite number of offenses initially
needed to classify a motorist as a habitual offender will result in an
automatic revocation of that motorist's operating privilege for an ad-
ditional period of two years,8 ' regardless of whether that motorist
has been formally convicted of the initial charges or formally notified
of his habitual offender status.8'
D. Procedure
More than just the technical mechanics of Section 154283 must
be addressed in order to obtain a full comprehension of the statute.
Both administrative actions and judicial review also have an impor-
tant impact on how Section 1542 functions.
Under the Vehicle Code, the Department of Transportation is
required to administer all of the Code's provisions and to keep
records of convictions under the Vehicle Code of all motorists in the
Commonwealth.84 With respect to Section 1542, this means that the
Department of Transportation must revoke the operating privilege of
any motorist for a period of five years if it receives three certified
copies indicating three convictions of the motorist. 85 As the Depart-
ment of Transportation's actions are mandatory, it has no discretion
with respect to the revocation.86
78. Id. at 571, 505 A.2d at 1131.
79. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(e).
80. Id. See also infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
81. See Martino v. Commonwealth, Pa. Commw. -, - A.2d - (1988)
(to be reported at 541 A.2d 524). See also Commonwealth v. Gray, 59 Pa. Commw. 590, 430
A.2d 407 (1981); Commonwealth v. Garvin, 67 Pa. Commw. 425, 447 A.2d 695 (1982).
82. See In re Rock, 102 Pa. Commw. 449, 518 A.2d 1303 (1986); Commonwealth v.
Frye, 88 Pa. Commw. 380, 489 A.2d 984, appeal granted, 508 Pa. 356, 497 A.2d 1330
(1985); Commonwealth v. Altimus, 49 Pa. Commw. 245, 410 A.2d 1303 (1980).
83. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542.
84. Id. § 1531 (administration of system by department).
85. Id. § 1542(a).
86. See Martino v. Commonwealth, - Pa. Commw. A.2d - (1988)
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The Department of Transportation is required to notify a mo-
torist of this revocation.8 7 Once the motorist receives that notice, the
Vehicle Code permits the motorist to appeal to a court vested with
competent jurisdiction.8 Once an appeal is filed it will act as a su-
persedeas, 89 and no revocation of the motorist's operating privilege
may be imposed until there has been a final determination of the
matter.90
If a motorist does choose to appeal his revocation, the Depart-
ment of Transportation has the burden of demonstrating by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the motorist's driving record, as
maintained by the Department, shows three convictions for enumer-
ated offenses within a five year period. To meet this burden, the De-
partment of Transportation must introduce the motorist's certified
driving record into evidence. 1 Once the Department of Transporta-
tion establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the mo-
torist to prove that there should be no revocation. 2 The motorist,
however, may not meet this burden of proof by collaterally attacking
any one of the underlying criminal convictions that were considered
in the determination of his status as a habitual offender.93
E. Attacks on Constitutionality
There have been many constitutional challenges to Section
1542. 94 In fact, litigation surrounding this statute has been so abun-
dant that not even the title95 of the statute has been immune.96 The
(to be reported at 541 A.2d 425); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 68 Pa. Commw. 384, 449 A.2d
121 (1982); Commonwealth v. Nyman, 218 Pa. Super. 221, 275 A.2d 836 (1971).
87. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1540 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
88. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1550 (1984). See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 933(a)(I)(ii)
(1982) (courts of common pleas shall hear appeals from government agencies).
89. A supersedeas is -[t]he name of a writ containing a command to stay the proceed-
ings at law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (5th ed. 1979).
90. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1550(b).
91. See Commonwealth v. Shero, 5 Pa. Commw. 473, 475, 291 A.2d 342, 343 (1972).
92. See Commonwealth v. Siedlecki, 7 Pa. Commw. 130, 300 A.2d 287 (1975). See also
Commonwealth v. Gerhart, 96 Pa. Commw. 561, 507 A.2d 1309 (1986) (testimony of a mo-
torist's former attorney did not constitute substantial evidence to support the trial court's con-
clusion that that motorist successfully rebutted the Department of Transportation's evidence of
a conviction).
93. See Hillwig v. Commonwealth, No. 141 C.D. 1986 (Pa. Comm. Ct. April 27, 1987);
Wainer v. Commonwealth, No. 1461 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 27, 1987); Neumann v.
Commonwealth, No. 2637 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 28, 1986); Commonwealth v.
Valentine, 71 Pa. Commw. 8, 453 A.2d 742 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gray, 59 Pa. Commw.
590, 430 A.2d 407 (1981).
94. 75 PA. CONS. STAT, § 1542.
95. The title of Section 1542 is "Revocation of habitual offender's license." See id.
96. In Weaver v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. Commw. 625, 416 A.2d 628 (1980), the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court rejected the challenge of a motorist who claimed that the title
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courts, however, commencing their analysis of Section 1542 from a
view which presumes the constitutionality of legislation,9" have con-
sistently upheld its constitutionality in light of both the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the federal constitution.
1. Due Process.-The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has
held that, as long as a motorist is guaranteed a prompt post-suspen-
sion hearing, Section 1542 meets the constitutional requirements of
due process, 98 even though it initially revokes a motorist's operating
privilege without affording the motorist a hearing.99 Moreover, this
prompt post-suspension hearing, which affords a motorist both notice
and an opportunity to be heard, is adequate only if it takes the form
of a de novo hearing.100 Thus, in Liebler v. Commonwealth, Depart-
ment of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety,0 1 the Pennsylva-
nia Commonwealth Court, reprimanding a trial court for summarily
dismissing a motorist's appeal and denying the motorist a hearing,
stated:
License suspensions under Section 1542 of the [Vehicle]
Code are ...summary in nature, and Section 1550 provides
the means for a motorist to challenge the merits of the suspen-
sion. To deny a hearing for [a motorist] under Section 1550
would be to deny the process that is due him. We hold that Sec-
tion 1550 entitles [a motorist] to a de novo hearing on the mer-
its of his suspension.
0 2
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has also held that due
process does not require that a motorist be warned in a criminal pro-
ceeding of any possible civil consequences that may result from his
actions.10 For example, in Brewster v. Commonwealth, Department
of Section 1542 violated article Ill, section three of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which pro-
hibits a bill from having a title which does not clearly express its meaning. The motorist con-
tended that the ordinary meaning of "'habitual" refers to one who errs often over a period of
time, while Section 1542 can apply to a motorist who receives three convictions from one
singular act. Id. See also Nolt v. Commonwealth, 64 Pa. Commw. 144, 439 A.2d 874 (1982).
97. See Lehigh Foundations v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 39 Pa.
Commw. 416, 423, 395 A.2d 576, 580 (1978).
98. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
99. See Liebler v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. Commw. 270, 476 A.2d 1389 (1984).
100. See Yeckley v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. Commw. 576, 474 A.2d 71 (1984). See also
Werner v. Commonwealth, No. 2913 C.D. 1985 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed July 13, 1987);
Brophy v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 310, 503 A.2d 1010 (1986); Brewster v. Common-
wealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986); Zanotto v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa.
Commw. 69, 475 A.2d 1375 (1984); In re Elias, 70 Pa. Commw. 404, 453 A.2d 372 (1982).
101. See supra note 99.
102. Id. at 273-74, 476 A.2d at 1391 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
103. See Hillwig v. Commonwealth, No. 141 C.D. 1986 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed April
27, 1987); Commonwealth v. McDevitt, 57 Pa. Commw. 589, 427 A.2d 2890 (1980), aff'd,
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of Transportation,'° the Commonwealth Court held that Brewster's
rights under due process were not violated when no one told him that
the civil consequence of his acceptance of Accelerative Rehabilita-
tive Disposition'0 5 would be the revocation of his license.10 6 The
court reasoned that Brewster's due process rights were adequately
protected in his post-suspension de novo hearing. '
2. Equal Protection.-Section 1542 has also been held to be
constitutionally sound under an equal protection analysis.108 In
Yeckley v. Commonwealth,'0 9 the motorist argued that the revoca-
tion of his operating privilege pursuant to Section 1542 denied him
equal protection of the law." 0 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court did not agree for two reasons. First, the Department of Trans-
portation, in revoking a motorist's operating privilege pursuant to
Section 1542, must do so pursuant to the mandate of the statute. It
may not exercise its discretion in making the revocation."' Second,
and more importantly, habitual offenders are not a suspect class nor
is driving a fundamental right." 2 Thus, under a rational relationship
standard, Section 1542 passes constitutional muster." S
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.-Section 1542 has also
been found to be constitutionally sound in terms of the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."" In Drogowski
v. Commonwealth,' 5 the motorist argued that the revocation of his
operating privilege pursuant to Section 1542 constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, because the convictions that gave rise to his
revocation were all the result of a single incident, caused by his
schizophrenia and alcohol addiction for which he later received
treatment."" The Commonwealth Court, however, held that under
the Pennsylvania Constitution, the concept of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment was only applicable to criminal proceedings and not to civil
500 Pa. 530, 458 A.2d 939 (1983).
104. 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986).
105. See supra note 62.
106. Brewster v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 277, 281, 503 A.2d 497, 498.
107. Id.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
109. 81 Pa. Commw. 576, 474 A.2d 71 (1984).




114. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
115. 94 Pa. Commw. 205, 503 A.2d 104 (1986).
116. Id. at 208, 503 A.2d at 106.
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proceedings such as operating privilege revocation cases.11 7 More-
over, even if it were applicable, under both the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution and the United States Constitution, Section 1542 is not cruel
and unusual punishment, because the revocation of a habitual of-
fender's operating privilege is not primarily imposed because of a
motorist's culpability. Rather, the revocation's purpose is to protect
the public from the type of conduct demonstrated by that motorist's
driving habits.11 8 In Yeckley," 9 the Commonwealth Court further
held that a revocation of a motorist's operating privilege does not
"shock the general conscience"' 0 and therefore cannot amount to
cruel and unusual punishment.'
4. Double Jeopardy.-The Commonwealth Court addressed
the issue of whether Section 1542 violated the double jeopardy
clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution 2 in Zanotto v. Common-
wealth.'23 In rejecting Zanotto's challenge of double jeopardy, the
court held that since revocation of a motorist's operating privilege is
a remedial sanction that is civil in nature and is designed primarily
to protect the public from unsafe drivers, it cannot be grounds for a
double jeopardy challenge. 2
III. Inherent Problems with Section 1542
Although Section 1542125 has met constitutional muster, close
scrutiny of the section nevertheless reveals several inherent problems
and weaknesses that require the Pennsylvania Legislature's reconsid-
eration and compel correction.
A. Mandatory Revocation
Once the Department of Transportation receives notice that a
motorist has been convicted of three violations of any of Section
1542's enumerated offenses within a five year period, the Depart-
ment of Transportation is compelled to revoke that motorist's operat-
117. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 13. See Drogowski, 94 Pa. Commw. at 208-09, 503 A.2d at
106.
118. Drogowski, 94 Pa. Commw. at 209, 503 A.2d at 107.
119. 81 Pa. Commw. 576, 474 A.2d 71 (1984).
120. Id. at 578, 474 A.2d at 72.
121. Id.
122. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
123. 83 Pa. Commw. 69, 475 A.2d 1375 (1984).
124. Id. at 71, 475 A.2d at 1376.
125. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542 (1984).
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ing privilege.1 16 The Department of Transportation has no discretion
with respect to imposing this revocation. 12 7 It is obliged to impose
the mandatory penalty regardless of any mitigating circumstances.12
Courts also have no leeway to modify the five-year revocation
imposed on a motorist by the Department of Transportation pursu-
ant to Section 1542. The only proper grounds for any appeal are
limited solely to a determination of whether the Department of
Transportation adequately proved that the motorist's record showed
that that motorist had accumulated three convictions, and whether
the Department of Transportation acted accordingly in revoking that
motorist's operating privilege. 12 9 Under such narrow strictures,
therefore, courts are powerless to modify the mandatory revocation
imposed by the Department, despite the hardships that such an in-
flexible sanction may impose.130 Under Section 1542, all motorists,
regardless of the differences in the severities of the violations that
they have committed, are treated in the same unbending and con-
stant fashion. Thus, irrespective of such differences or even the pres-
ence of mitigating factors, all habitual offenders lose their operating
privileges for a mandatory five year period.31
B. No Duty to Warn of Civil Consequences of Conviction
The revocation of a motorist's operating privilege is a civil pro-
ceeding' 3 2 and, therefore, a motorist does not have the right to court-
appointed counsel.133 A motorist also does not have the right to be
warned that a payment of a fine will result in a conviction 3 4 or that
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 68 Pa. Commw. 384, 449 A.2d 121 (1982).
130. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Vernon, 23 Pa. Commw. 260, 262, 351 A.2d 694,
695 (1976) (a trail court "may not, because of the possible unfairness or inequity of the result,
reverse the Department or modify the penalties imposed.").
131. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(a).
132. See Wainer v. Commonwealth, No. 1461 C.D. 1984 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed Jan.
27, 1987); Drogowski v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. Commw. 205, 503 A.2d 104 (1986); Com-
monwealth v. Conner, 96 Pa. Commw. 26, 506 A.2d 514 (1986); Brewster v. Commonwealth,
94 Pa. Commw. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986); Zanotto v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. Commw. 69,
475 A.2d 1375 (1984); Commonwealth v. Valentine, 71 Pa. Commw. 8, 453 A.2d 742 (1982);
Callan v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Commw. 635, 339 A.2d 163 (1975).
133. See Kase v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. Commw. 414, 489 A.2d 986 (1985) (the sub-
stantive due process right to effective assistance of counsel is not extended to civil or adminis-
trative proceedings, but rather is limited to criminal prosecutions). See also Johnson v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Board, 14 Pa. Commw. 220, 321 A.2d 728 (1974).
134. See cases cited supra note 34. See also Martino v. Commonwealth, - A.2d
-, - Pa. Commw. - (1988) (to be reported at 541 A.2d 425) (reaffirming that a
payment of a fine constitutes a conviction under Section 1542). In Martino, the motorist ar-
gued that she did not know at the time she paid her fines that they would constitute convic-
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his acceptance into Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposition will also
constitute a conviction.' 5 Further, a motorist has no right to be
warned that the civil consequence of such actions will be the revoca-
tion of his operating privilege. 3
In addition, after a motorist receives notice that his operating
privilege has been revoked (and therefore finally realizes the severity
of his circumstances), he cannot collaterally attack any of the under-
lying criminal convictions which were calculated in the determina-
tion of his habitual offender status, regardless of his ignorance dur-
ing the prior proceedings or even the inaccuracy of the convictions
themselves.13 7 The case of Commonwealth v. Ra s8 is a perfect ex-
ample of how severe this restriction on collateral attacks can be on
an ignorantly but innocently made conviction. In that case, a Korean
motorist's car was stolen and then allegedly involved in a traffic of-
fense. 39 Because the motorist knew little English, he misunderstood
the authorities and paid the fine for that offense because he thought
that he was required to do so."10 Because he paid this fine, he was
subsequently convicted of violating Section 374341 of the Vehicle
Code, and his license was suspended.'42 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court upheld his conviction and refused to allow
him to collaterally attack it." 3
C. Habitual Offender Status Can Result from a Single Incident
Under Section 1542, a motorist can become a habitual offender
in the span of three minutes"' or even less." 5 Although this inter-
tions. Moreover, she also argued that she paid the fines because she was not afforded the
opportunity to seek legal assistance. The court not only rejected both of her arguments, but
also imposed attorney's fees against her for pursuing what it termed a frivolous appeal. Id.
135. See cases cited supra note 35.
136. See supra note 36.
137. See supra note 93.
138. No. 2321 C.D. 1985 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. I1, 1987).
139. Id. slip op. at 2.
140. Id.
141. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3743 (1984) (accidents involving damage to attended vehicle
or property).
142. Commonwealth v. Ra, No. 2321 C.D. 1985, slip op. at I (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept.
II, 1987).
143. Id. at 3. The trial court had determined that the motorist's guilty plea - his pay-
ment of the fine - was not intelligently made and that it would have been a manifest injustice
to deprive him of his operating privilege. The Commonwealth Court, however, in overturning
the decision, stated that -[a]lthough the trial judge's compassion toward an individual who
had difficulty comprehending the consequence of paying a fine on a traffic citation is under-
standable, collateral review of the criminal conviction in the suspension appeal is not allowa-
ble." Id.
144. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 68 Pa. Commw. 384, 449 A.2d 121 (1982).
145. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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pretation has been held to be constitutional,""8 it is questionable
whether it is fair or even proper to penalize equally a motorist who
has committed three traffic violations within a single incident and a
motorist who repeatedly has violated and disregarded the traffic laws
over a five year period.
Despite these problems, Section 1542 has continuously with-
stood attacks to its constitutionality and has been found to meet the
minimum requirements of fairness and due process." 7 The question
that naturally arises, however, is whether the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania should be satisfied with this statute when it barely
meets minimum requirements of constitutionality and fairness. Per-
haps there is a better and more effective way to constitutionally reg-
ulate habitual traffic offenders in this Commonwealth and at the
same time afford these offenders more than the minimum safeguards
present under Section 1542.
IV. Alternative Methods of Dealing with the Habitual Traffic
Offender
It has always been recognized that one of the functions of state
governments is to license and regulate their motorists." 8 It is not
surprising, therefore, that Pennsylvania is not the only state to have
a specific habitual offender statute within its traffic regulations" 9 or
that Pennsylvania's method of regulating those offenders is not the
only way in which it is done.150
A. Habitual Offender Statutes in Other States
Presently, twenty-four other states have enacted specific habit-
ual offender statutes. 5' Several other states, while not enacting spe-
146. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
148. AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY FOUNDATION. SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION OF DRIVER'S
LICENSES (1966).
149. See infra note 151.
150. See infra notes 156-77 and accompanying text.
151. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 1460.3 (Deering Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-201
to -207 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 2801 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.264 (West
Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 68B-308 (Harrison Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-12-1-1
to -7 (Burns 1987); IowA CODE ANN. § 321.555 (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-284 to -
293 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.1471 to .1481 (West Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 22f (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2291-2298B (Supp.
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.18 (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-11-201 to -205
(1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:18-262:25 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-30a to -
30e (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 809.600 to .660 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-40-1
to -13 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1010 to -1130 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
55-10-601 to -617 (1987 Supp.); TEX. HIGH. CODE ANN. § 6687b (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA.
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cific habitual offender provisions, have met their regulatory function
by imposing a mandatory suspension or revocation on a motorist's
operating privilege for either specifically enumerated single offenses
or three convictions within varying time periods of reckless driv-
ing. 152 Still other states rely solely on a point system in order to reg-
ulate their licensed motorists. 153
Among those states that have enacted specific habitual offender
provisions, no two statutes are identical.'" Thus, while twenty-five
states have decided that they do have a legitimate interest in protect-
ing their motorists and promoting public safety 55 through such ha-
bitual offender provisions, there is considerable disagreement on how
to determine who habitual offenders are and just how to penalize
them. Some of the prevalent differences found among these habitual
offender statutes are as follows:
1. Length of Time in Which Offenses Must Occur.-The
length of time in which the offenses must occur in order for a motor-
ist to be classified as a habitual offender varies greatly, ranging from
one year in Texas151 to an unidentified period of time in Montana.1
5 7
In Pennsylvania, the requisite number of convictions must occur
within a five year period.1
58
2. Number of Convictions Needed to Obtain Habitual Of-
fender Status.-The number of convictions needed in order for a
motorist to become a habitual offender ranges from two convictions
CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.1 to -387.12 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 673 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 46.65.010 to .910 (1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 351.01 to .A1 (West Supp. 1987).
152. See ALA. CODE § 32-5A-195 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 28-15-191 (1987); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-446 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1029 (1979); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-11I (West Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 49-329 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
95 /, para. 6-205 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 205 (1977); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 9.2003 (Callaghan 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.18 (West 1986); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 63-1-51 (Supp. 1987); NC. GEN. STAT. § 20-17 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-31
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-424 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483.460 (Michi 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-29 (1978); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1986); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.16 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-205 (West Supp. 1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-12-52 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-2-127 (Supp. 1987); W.
VA. CODE § 17B-3-6 (1986); WYO. STAT. § 31-7-126 (1984).
153. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-128 (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.304 (Vernon Supp.
1987).
154. See supra note 151.
155. Reese, Summary Suspension of Driver Licenses of Drunken Driv-
ers-Constitutional Dimensions, REDUCING HIGHWAY CRASHES THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE
LICENSE REVOCATION (U.S. Dep't. of Transp. ed. 1986) [hereinafter "Reese"].
156. See TEx. HIGH. CODE ANN. § 6687b (Vernon Supp. 1987).
157. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-11-201 to -205 (1987) (a motorist obtains habitual
offender status only by accumulating thirty points).
158. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542 (1984).
93 DiCKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1988
in Indiana' to twenty convictions in Washington."" Most statutes
dictate that the more serious offenses require a lesser number of con-
victions in order for habitual offender status to be obtained, while a
higher number of convictions for lesser traffic offenses and moving
violations are required in order for a motorist to become a habitual
offender.1 61 Pennsylvania requires three convictions in order for a
motorist to be classified a habitual offender and does not distinguish
between major and minor offenses.
162
3. Multiple Offenses During a Single Incident.-Like Pennsyl-
vania, some states allow habitual offender status to result from one
incident as long as the requisite number of convictions result., 3
Other states, however, specifically prohibit such a result by expressly
wording their statutes to make the occurrence of multiple offenses
during a single event equal only one offense for the purpose of their
habitual offender statutes, as long as the offenses occur within a
specified period of time.'64
4. Mandatory Revocation Versus Suspension.-Most states
require the mandatory revocation of a motorist's operating privilege
once that motorist is determined to be a habitual offender.'6 5 Penn-
159. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-12-1-1 to -7 (Burns 1987).
160. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.654.010 (1987).
161. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 809.600 (1985) (requiring three convictions of major
offenses within fives years before habitual offender status is attained; providing for habitual
offender status after twenty minor violations). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 68B-308 (Harrison
Supp. 1987) (requiring three convictions for major offenses or 15 violations of lesser offenses
within five years to attain habitual offender status).
162. See supra note 1.
163. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-30a to -30e (West Supp. 1987); IOwA CODE ANN.
§ 321.555 (West 1985).
164. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-201 to -207 (1984) (multiple offenses commit-
ted within twenty-four hours are only counted as one offense for the purpose of its habitual
offender statute); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 2801 (1985) (multiple offenses committed within
twenty-four hours are only counted as one offense for the purpose of the habitual offender
statute); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.1471 to .1481 (West Supp. 1987) (multiple offenses com-
mitted within a twelve-hour period are only counted as one offense for the purpose of the
habitual offender statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 22f (West Supp. 1987 Cum.
Supp.) (multiple offenses committed in a six-hour period are only counted as one offense for
the purpose of the habitual offender statute); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-40-1 to -13 (1982) (the first
time that a motorist commits multiple offenses with a six-hour period, they are counted as one
offense for the purpose of the habitual offender statute); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-1010 to -1 130
(Law. Co-op. 1977) (multiple offenses committed within a twenty-four-hour period are
counted as only one offense for the purpose of the habitual offender statute); VA. CODE ANN. §
46.1-387.1 to -387.12 (1986) (multiple offenses committed within a six-hour period are
counted as only one offense for the purpose of the habitual offender statute); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 46.65.010 to .910 (1987) (multiple offenses committed within a six-hour period
are counted as only one offense for the purpose of the habitual offender statute).
165. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.264 (West Supp. 1987); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 351.01
to .ll (West Supp. 1987).
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sylvania is among these states. 6 However, a minority of states do
not even revoke the operating privilege of their habitual traffic of-
fenders. Instead, they merely suspend such offenders' operating
privileges.
167
5. Administrative or Judicial Discretion.-Several states, even
those who require a mandatory revocation of a habitual offender's
operating privilege, allow either administrative or judicial discretion
to be exercised once a minimum period of revocation has been
served.168 These states permit the issuance of a probationary or re-
stricted license if a motorist is able to demonstrate an "undue hard-
ship"16 9 or a "special need"170 to have a license issued before the
*period of revocation is terminated.17 1 Pennsylvania is not among
these states.
172
6. Length of Revocation.-There also exist disparities in the
length of the revocation or suspension of a habitual offender's oper-
ating privilege from state to state. 7 3 In Texas, for example, a habit-
ual offender cannot lose his license for more than one year. 74 By
contrast, a habitual offender in Maine can lose his license for an
indefinite period of time, and the reinstatement of such a privilege is
contingent upon the performance of several driving improvement
programs and court discretion.' Virginia has the longest expressly
stated period of revocation, which equals ten years. 1 6 Pennsylvania
revokes the operating privilege of its habitual offender for a period of
five years.
77
166. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
167. See IND. CODE ANN. § 91-12-1-1 to -7 (Burns 1987); TEX. HIGH. CODE ANN. §
6678b (Vernon Supp. 1987). See supra note 10 for the distinction between a revocation and a
suspension.
168. Some states permit the issuance of a probationary license. See GA. CODE ANN. §
68B-308 (Harrison Supp. 1987) (allows issuance of a probationary license); IND. CODE ANN. §
9-12-1-1 to -7 (Burns 1987); OR. REV. STAT. 809.600 to .660 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 46.65.010 to .910 (1987).
169. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 22f (West Supp. 1987); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
351.01 to .11 (West Supp. 1987).
170. See TEX. HIGH. CODE ANN. § 6687b (Vernon Supp. 1987).
171. For example, "undue hardship" or "special need" exists when a motorist needs his
license in order to work or to get to work. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2291-2298B
(Supp. 1986).
172. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 151. See also U.S. DEP'T. OF TRANSP., A DIGEST OF STATE ALCO-
HOL HIGHWAY SAFETY RELATED LEGISLATION (March 1986).
174. TEX. HIGH. CODE ANN. § 6687b (Vernon Supp. 1987).
175. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2291-2298B (Supp. 1986).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-387.1 to -387.12 (1986).
177. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(d) (1984).
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B. Other Suggested Standards
In addition to the varying approaches taken by other state legis-
latures, other methods of regulating habitual traffic offenders have
been espoused. The American Bar Association, in promulgating its
recommendations on suggested traffic regulations, has recognized the
need for a motorist to be fully advised of the consequences of any
guilty plea, any plea of nolo contendere, or any type of forfeiture
that that motorist might enter as a result of violating a traffic law.
17 8
It has further recommended that a motorist, even though he may
have no constitutional right to be represented by counsel, should at
least be advised that he may retain his own legal counsel if he so
desires. 7 9
Moreover, the American Bar Association has endorsed the pro-
position that courts, rather than having absolutely no power to mod-
ify mandatory penalties, should have the right to exercise their dis-
cretion in imposing traffic penalties.180 In its commentary addressed
to this provision, the American Bar Association stated:
A number of states have passed statutes requiring incarcer-
ation and/or license suspension upon conviction of major viola-
tions, such as drunk driving and unlicensed driving. Such
mandatory sentence statutes cause distortion throughout the
traffic enforcement system, from arrest to trial. They foster plea-
bargaining, which subverts confidence in the enforcement system
and driver records. They cause inequities to drivers charged in
similar circumstances, and subvert rehabilitation efforts. Serious
traffic cases should be heard only by fully qualified judges, and
the discretion of such judges to alleviate penalties should be no
more limited in traffic cases than in other forms of antisocial
behavior.'
178. See STANDARDS FOR TRAFFIC JUSTICE § 3.2, at 6 (1975) [hereinafter STANDARDS].
The commentary, noted that
[t]he vast majority of traffic cases are terminated by pleas of guilty, or an
equivalent. A defendant, whether or not he appears in court, should be advised
of his rights or the consequences of his plea, including sanctions imposed for
repeated offenses (i.e., point system; habitual offender acts) by some other
means, so that an intelligent and knowing plea can be made, but "guilty with
explanation" pleas should be discouraged. Careful explanation of the conse-
quences of bail forfeiture or failure to appear is required because of local varia-
tions. Defendant's rights should not be abridged in the name of efficiency or
expediency.
Id.
179. Id. at § 3.8, at 7.
180. Id. at § 4.3, at 9.
181. Id. at § 4.3, at 9.
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The American Bar Association has not been alone in voicing its
opinion on what rights motorists should be afforded in traffic regula-
tions. Professor John Reese' 82 recommends that state statutes which
allow the suspension or revocation of a motorist's operating privilege
should clearly indicate that the government's sole interest in such
legislation is the removal of hazardous motorists from the highways,
that they should give a motorist notice of any possible collateral con-
sequences that they might face, and they they should allow for a
prompt post-suspension hearing.188
V. Recommendations: Toward a Fairer Result
After analyzing Section 1542,8" the habitual traffic offender
statutes of other states, 85 and other suggested standards on what
rights should be afforded motorists under traffic regulations,' 86 it
must be concluded that while Section 1542187 is both constitutional
and minimally fair, 88 it falls short of satisfactorily regulating habit-
ual offenders and promoting the state interest of public safety. Sev-
eral changes Would effectively enhance the adequacy of the statute.
A. Judicial Discretion Should Be Allowed
As it presently stands, Section 1542 is a mandatory statute
which leaves absolutely no discretion to either the Department of
Transportation or any court to modify its five-year revocation of a
motorist's operating privilege. 89 Several states do not see the need to
have such a rigid statutory requirement. 90 Likewise, the American
Bar Association discourages limiting a court's discretion in this mat-
ter. 91 Section 1542, therefore, should not be so rigid. Courts should
be allowed to take into consideration mitigating circumstances and
undue hardships1'" and to impose a penalty of revocation on a mo-
torist between a fixed maximum and minimum number of years.
Under such a provision, the deterrent effect of revocation would still
be present, while at the same time, the unique circumstances of indi-
182. John H. Reese is a Professor of Law at the University of Denver.
183. Reese, supra note 155, at 58.
184. See supra notes 9-93 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 151-77 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
187. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542 (1984).
188. See supra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 171.
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vidual motorists could be considered.
B. Restricted Licenses Should Be Made Available in Limited
Circumstances
In addition to the presence of judicial discretion under Section
1542, courts should also have the option of allowing a motorist to
receive a restricted license if that motorist can prove the need for
one. 193 The most obvious circumstance in which a motorist would be
able to meet this burden of proof would be when a motorist must
either drive to work or travel a great distance in order to get
there.194 There is, however, some authority to suggest that the avail-
ability of a restricted license before at least some of the total revoca-
tion period is served detracts from the deterrent effect of the revoca-
tion. 195 This option, therefore, should be made available to the
court's discretion only after a specific time period of the revocation
has been served.
C. A Motorist Should Not Be Classified as a Habitual Offender
for Multiple Offenses Committed During a Single Incident
Under the present provisions of Section 1542, a motorist who
commits three offenses within three minutes is treated as harsh as a
motorist who consistently shows total disregard for the law and the
safety of the public over a five-year period.1 9' As a result, habitual
offender status is attained whenever a motorist is convicted of three
violations of the traffic laws, regardless of whether those violations
take three minutes or a period of five years to occur. 19 7 While this
193. For the states that do allow the issuance of a probationary or restricted license, see
footnotes 169-71 and accompanying text.
The issuance of a restricted license is a practical consideration. James Latchaw of the
National Highway Traffic Administration, in a brief presented at the Tenth International Fo-
rum on Traffic Records Systems in Orlando, Florida, readily admitted that close to 80% of the
motorists who have their operating privileges revoked or suspended drive anyway. See
Latchaw, The Federal Position on Administrative License Suspensions and Other Issues, No-
TABLE PAPERS ON ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY-1984, at 2 (U.S. Dep't of Transp. ed.
1985). It therefore would not be unreasonable to suggest that people who need to drive in
order to work and/or to continue to work are among this number.
194. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2291-2298B (Supp. 1986) (permitting the issu-
ance of a working license).
195. See Chrystal, Avoidable Pitfalls in Administrative Suspension Programs, REDUC-
ING HIGHWAY CRASHES THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATION, at 21-23 (U.S.
Dep't of Transp. ed. 1986).
196. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth




interpretation of Section 1542 has been held constitutional, 98 its
practicality is questionable. Other states that have enacted habitual
traffic offender statutes have specific provisions within their statutes
to prohibit such an illogical result. 99 Pennsylvania should not hesi-
tate from doing the same.
D. A Motorist Should Be Given Limited Warnings on the Conse-
quences of His Actions
Since the law prohibiting collateral attacks on improper crimi-
nal convictions in a civil proceeding is too firmly engrained in our
legal system, 200 it appears that the only way to alleviate the manifest
unfairness faced by a motorist who has been improperly convicted
and who cannot then collaterally attack that conviction on appeal is
to prevent that initial conviction from ever occurring. This result,
however, can be achieved only if a motorist is fully advised of his
legal rights and the other nuances of the law, such as the fact that a
payment of a fine will result in a conviction which will be counted in
a determination of a motorist's habitual offender status.01 Presently,
neither the courts nor the Department of Transportation has the
duty to warn a motorist of such collateral consequences.20 2 The
American Bar Association recognizes the unfairness of such a lack
of duty and suggests that someone 20 3 should at least advise a motor-
ist of his right to retain an attorney if he has the means to do So.201
The American Bar Association also suggests that a motorist should
be informed that the payment of a fine or a forfeiture of bail will
constitute a conviction. 20 5 The amount of time that it would take for
a clerk or a judge to inform a motorist of such consequences and the
amount of money that it would take to put an informational state-
ment on a citation to inform motorists that a payment of the fine will
equate a conviction are outweighed by the fairness and justness that
198. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 164.
200. See supra note 36. For a good discussion'on the applicability of collateral attacks
to habitual offender statutes in general, see Feldman, The Habitual Offender Laws of Tennes-
see, 14 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 302 (1984).
201. See cases cited supra note 34.
202. See supra note 36.
203. See STANDARDS, supra note 178, § 3.8, at 7. The ABA does not specify who this
"somebody" should be. Since its commentary to this provision is addressed to traffic courts,
however, it seems to imply that this "somebody" should be either the courts or their adminis-
trative personnel.
204. Id.
205. Id. at § 3.2, at 6.
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the motorists in Pennsylvania would realize by such actions." °
E. More Information Should Be Made Available to the Public
About Section 1542
Perhaps the best way to achieve the above goals is through a
public educational campaign to promote an awareness and a better
understanding of the existence of Section 1542.07 First, citizens
should know that Pennsylvania has a habitual offender statute in its
Vehicle Code.208 Also, the general public must be provided with a
least a general understanding of how the statute operates and what
rights they have under it.2 0' This goal may be accomplished through
the distribution of printed materials such as pamphlets, the use of
public announcements through the media, and instruction in the
State's schools. 10 Motorists should not learn of the existence of the
statute for the first time when they receive notice from the Depart-
ment of Transportation that their operating privilege has been re-
voked pursuant its mandate.
VI. Conclusion
As it exists today, Section 1542 is a harsh provision concealed
206. As the ABA effectively states, "Defendant's rights should not be abridged in the
name of efficiency or expediency." Id. at 8.
207. For an excellent overview of the administrative licensing process, see J.H. REESE,
POWER, POLICY, PEOPLE-A STUDY OF DRIVER LICENSING ADMINISTRATION (1971). With
specific regard to the right of motorists to have access to information, Reese stated,
[W]hat is also needed is mass information as to how driver licensing agen-
cies are exercising their power. The formal legal protections provided may be
more illusory than real, for most people who are subjected to license denial or
with withdrawal decisions do not resort to them to vindicate their interests. Fur-
thermore, not all members of the regulated group have effective access to the
formal legal processes. That is, minority groups and persons of limited financial
means may be aware of formal legal mechanisms but afraid or unable to utilize
them. In addition, the driving public is an inarticulate amorphous group that has
not had an effective voice advocating its interests to policy makers. Lacking this
opportunity, however, some other means must be found by which to provide
some modicum of protection for the interests of such unheard citizens.
Id. at 181.
208. Of course, the Vehicle Code and its provisions are available to all citizens, and they
are assumed to know what the law is. See People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 617 P.2d 1178
(1980) (publication of a statute is constitutionally sufficient notice). Even a cursory glance at
the cases citing Section 1542, however, reveals that the same issues are constantly being reliti-
gated. See supra notes 16-69. This wealth of litigation suggests that little or nothing is known
about the statute.
209. See supra notes 9-124 and accompanying text.
210. See generally The Role of Communications in an Effective Comprehensive State
Alcohol Safety Program, in NOTABLE PAPERS ON ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY-1984, 7-
25 (U.S. Dep't of Transp. ed. 1985).
211. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1542(a).
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within the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code that is uniformly and inflexi-
bly imposed upon all motorists who come within its startling grasp.
Yet despite its harshness and apparent unfairness, the statute has
repeatedly withstood attacks to its constitutionality. The inescapable
question that must be addressed, therefore, is whether Pennsylvania
should be satisfied with a statute that, although constitutional, is
merely adequate in terms of fairness to the motorists who are regu-
lated under its provisions.
The answer to this simple but important question is obviously
no. There are better and fairer ways to regulate habitual traffic of-
fenders, which at the same time protect and promote the important
governmental interest of maintaining public safety. The Pennsylva-
nia Legislature should consider adopting such changes in Section
1542, since the courts are rendered powerless to afford a judicial
remedy. The rights of Pennsylvania's motorists should not be re-
stricted to their bare minimum in the face of viable alternatives, par-
ticularly when many individual's livelihoods depend on being able to
drive on the Commonwealth's highways.
Lisa M. Cavage

